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many masters there shall be over the transportation system, as who shall be
the master. The Arnold-Wiprud master would, at best, be a policeman
wielding a corrective stick in an area of activity urgently in need of the tools
of a planner. Mr. Drayton, on the other hand, has a master and a plan. But
unfortunately, his is not a master plan in the public interest.
JULIUS COHEN t
THE MEDIEVAL IDEA OF LAW. By Walter Ullmann, with an introduction by
Harold Dexter Hazeltine. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1946. Pp. 220.
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THE most important work of Lucas de Penna (ob. 1390), a contemporary
of Bartolus and Baldus, is a very full commentary on the Tres Libri, the last
three books of the Codex. It is not merely a simple gloss on a well-known
text, but more accurately, a number of comprehensive legal treatises hung
upon it, the provisions of the Code furnishing a series of convenient points of
departure. Nine sixteenth century editions of the Commentaria sufficiently
attest its popularity and usefulness, but in more recent times neither the vol-
ume nor its author has attracted the attention of any but the learned. This
undeserved neglect now has been remedied, for an account of Lucas de Penna
and an analysis of his work form the major portion of Dr. Ullmann's book,
which thus would seem less a treatise on the medieval idea of law than an
exposition of the ideas of a fourteenth century Italian jurist. But this is only
a partial truth. Though Lucas de Penna is without doubt its central figure,
the volume provides interstitially a general view of late medieval juristic
thought. Emphasis within this field is placed almost completely upon the
broad jurisprudential and philosophic aspects of law, though some attention
is devoted to the no less revealing details of its practical, administrative side.
Thus Dr. Ullmann's volume is essentially an account of Lucas de Penna's
social, legal, and political ideas, extracted from the Commentaria, supple-
mented by shorter discussions of these same subjects drawn from the writings
of other contemporary post-Glossators.
For Lucas de Penna, as for most jurists in the middle ages, justice is pre-
eminent and sovereign. Law can be an enforceable rule of action only when
its ordinances realize the idea of right.' Only in so far as decisions embody
justice do they acquire validity and authority.' "Humanae leges eatenus
valent, quatenus non discrepant a divinis." 3 Despite the explicit command of
the ruler, an appointed judge may be objected to and removed exjusta causa,
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and he cannot, for example, be made judge in his own case.4 "Manifestum
est, quod cur voluntas principis ad aeguitate, juslitia et ratione devicet, non est
lex." 5 The king is a legitimate ruler only so long as his government conforms
to the requirements of justice; if it does not, he is a tyrant, and tyrannicide
is eminently justifiable.6 "Sublata naingue juslitia et regna, res Inblicac
urbium singularur nihil aliud sunt guam latrocinia." ' Such statements are
characteristic of the ethical or moral State in which both the ruler and the
ruled are subject to justice, or to law, which as hypostatized, articulated
justice is identical with it.8 And it is clear that much in medieval society,
not yet complicated by problems beyond ineum et uum and secure in an ac-
cepted ethic based upon the solid bedrock of belief, lent support to the hy-
pothesis that justice provided the ultimate touchstone of human behavior
and was an ascertainable absolute, to be recognized in every case with im-
mediately apprehended confidence.
This is the face of the medal, but in the middle ages its reverse was not
hidden from view. When applied to what may be called public law, the
idea of justice as a controlling principle required modifications that vitiated
to some extent an analysis based essentially upon observations drawn from
private litigation. The authoritative acts of the king, ruling as a representa-
tiv of God, were valid and enforceable though not always reconcilable with
ideas of right and law.' A royal enactment which transfers the property of
one to another but does not state the cause of the transfer, nevertheless
must be enforced by the judiciary on the presumption that it is based upon
justice, though it may in fact be contrajus naturae. If so, the ruler is respon-
sible to God and "peccat gravius et nwrtalius," but the requirements of ad-
ministration preclude investigation in each case. 10 In juristic theory the
ruler should not be legibus solutus, but punishment for non-compliance pre-
sented insurmountable practical difficulties which forced a more realistic
view."1 An enactment providing for expropriation or condemnation in the
public interest, or the withdrawal of privileges for reasons of public policy,
though a deprivation of property and contrary to natural and divine law,
must of necessity be permitted ratione publicae illiais.- Here the ruler
stands above the law, and these are cases in which concessions seemingly
were forced from the comprehensive theory of the moral State. But it is a
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mistake to think they were inroads upon it. The State did not exist free from
such concomitant exceptions, and no realistic medieval jurist could escape
the inconsistencies inherent in the organism he was explaining. Recognition
of these elements does not mark a retreat from an earlier position, nor do
contradictions necessarily indicate an age of transition. Lucas de Penna's
attempt is but one of a long series of noble, if finally unsuccessful, efforts to
resolve into one unified whole the two diverse principles of reason and fiat,
ratio et auctoritas.
Of these two irreconcilables, Lucas de Penna, imbued as he was with the
Christian ethic, stressed justice, the spirit of right, as the final arbiter of
human action. Page after page of Dr. Ullmann's book makes this clear. It
is disconcerting, therefore, to find this medieval jurist depicted as a precursor
of Bodin and as supporting, two centuries before its appearance, not only a
theory of absolute sovereignty but one of absolute legislative authority in
the ruler.'3 This is the result of Dr. Ullmann's emphasis upon a portion of
the whole. It must be borne in mind that in dealing with non-consecutive
works, such as the commentaries of the post-Glossators, it is difficult to
avoid presenting as abstract principles phrases and sentences torn from their
practical contexts. Having done that, it is no less difficult to resist pointing
parallels which often are less 'real than verbal. Much had to take place in
the practical sphere before the full implication of even the words of Baldus,
which go beyond Lucas de Penna's in supporting the plenitudo potestalis of
the ruler, were to mean that law had reconciled itself to being merely the
articulated will of a legal sovereign. But it must be said in fairness that
Dr. Ullmann's view of Lucas de Penna as foreshadowing modern political
thought and anticipating its doctrines does not distort his volume into a
one-sided thesis. On the contrary, it reflects the inconsistencies and confu-
sions inherent in his exemplar with fidelity, even to the inconvenience of the
reader. It is nonetheless a valuable exploratory venture into the treacherous
borderland between law and political theory and a useful guide to the thought
of a medieval jurist who, through it, once more gains a stature properly his.
Much of interest in the volume cannot be noticed at length here. A
chapter is devoted to Lucas de Penna's views on criminal law and punish-
ment, 14 another to the validity of customary law. There is much on the duty
and function of the judge, statutory interpretation, 15 the relations between
the temporal and spiritual jurisdictions, conflicting fourteenth century views
on a famous casus conscientiae,16 and on a variety of other topics of impor-
tance to the historian of medieval law. The scattered facts of Lucas de
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Penna's life are collected, and an enumeration of the principal authorities
used in his work is supplied. On the other hand, confusion is evident between
law as the received corputs of Roman doctrine and Jaw in the sense of legisla-
tion. Public and private law are insufficiently differentiated. There are some
obvious mistranslations, and the many general and inconclusive references
to English law might have been omitted with profit. Professor Hazeltine has
contributed another of his graceful introductions which skillfully sketches
the main currents in fourteenth century juristic thought and neatly relates
Lucas de Penna's writings to those of his better-known contemporaries.
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